The officers of PCSG recognize the nature of a changing threat, and the necessity for a proactive approach to mitigate that threat. There are solutions for passenger screening that rely on physical security, technology, and the human element. PCSG believes that the TSA has made large investments in time and money building a system that looks for dangerous "things" instead of dangerous people. We are convinced that this approach is fundamentally flawed.

The current state of passenger screening in the United States of America has made some limited improvements over the screening methods from pre 9/11. More "process" has been added in an effort to create a serious, but not necessarily more meaningful screening environment. The selectee process is significantly flawed and the secondary screening provides little if any advantage over the initial primary screening.

One of the most serious drawbacks to the present system is that the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has been pushed and pulled in different directions by many competing interests. The airlines continue to use (and have sole authority over) the subjective CAPPS I (Computer Assisted Passenger Pre-screening) system for "profiling." Unfortunately, the airlines scrubbed everything useful from the original CAPPS I program out of fear of discrimination law suites. In an effort to make it without bias, they have made it ineffective. The criterion to become a selectee has little bearing on potential terrorist activity, and with a significant percentage of passengers selected, it has more of a harassment effect than to serve a true security feature.

Have there been improvements? The TSA has attempted to take control of the CAPPS program with a second-generation format. This program was hailed as having the ability to fix many of the problems that had existed, and would be operated by the government, instead of each individual airline. CAPPS I became CAPPS II, and then evolved into the “Secure Flight” program – each version has been mired down with serious problems and contentious issues that the TSA did not resolve.

There is a system that exists that would provide a dramatic improvement in anti-terrorism mitigation, and provide an additional bonus of customer satisfaction. It is known as BPR, or Behavior Pattern Recognition.   To the TSA’s credit, they have pursued the use of a variation of this valuable technique.  If BPR were used as a major screening method, experts report that selectee counts would reduce from the current high numbers, down to a very low percentage. Additionally, that significantly smaller number of selectee’s would receive a more thorough and meaningful secondary screening than presently exists. This serious behavior focused program is specifically designed (in stark contrast to profiling) to look for traits exhibited by those with bad intentions, as opposed to looking at the wrong people for the wrong reasons.

At Boston Logan Airport, BPR was taught by Mr. Rafi Ron, President of New Age Security Solutions, to the Massachusetts State Troopers based there in October 2001. As an immediate result, the Massachusetts Port Authority (MASSPORT) reported non-terrorist related arrest increased by a marked percentage. Behavior Pattern Recognition, as its name suggests, looks for specific types of behavior, not a preconceived physical profile.

At the passenger screening portals, the ability to keep threatening intentions and material, such as explosives, off the aircraft cannot depend on the x-ray machines and TSA screeners alone. Chasing every tool a terrorist may use is sadly ineffective. The TSA is to be commended, however, for finally beginning to implement a BPR based system, which they now call the SPOT program (Selecting Passenger Observation Technique). While this is a good beginning, it is far from meeting its potential. The SPOT program only teaches TSA Security Officers how to detect one of three main elements that make BPR work.

The other two elements are delegated to the airport law enforcement officers, who clearly are the backbone of airport security. As trained law enforcement officers, they have the bearing, temperament, and most importantly the authority of law to conduct this important security feature, although they are not presently required to receive BPR training. It is important to note, that the airport law enforcement component is not limited to the screening portal, and they move freely throughout the entire airport in the conduct of their job.

Since airport law enforcement officers are not required to be trained in BPR, the SPOT program is likely destined to have limited success. The Richard Reid "shoe bomber" incident provides a good example of why this is a problem. Mr. Reid was selected by security screeners in France, and was then questioned by the French airport police. Their training focused the questions on criminal activity, not terrorist behavior, and therefore they did not recognize his terrorist intentions. He was released to travel on a subsequent flight; the flight aboard which he attempted to murder everyone on American Airlines flight 63, December 2001.

As an important note, the uniformed police at Boston Logan move throughout the entire airport environment, and are in a position to continually apply their BPR training, not solely at the screening portal as the SPOT program does. SPOT disables the effective BPR tools for use anywhere else in the airport environment. Fortunately, some large U.S. airports have contracted Mr. Ron directly for training, to the benefit of all those who travel through their specific airport.

As we look at technology, we recognize it has a necessary and evolving role in the passenger screening effort. A properly run BPR program in combination with K-9’s can be very effective at mitigating many types of "carry on explosives" and other threat behavior; "looking for bombers, not for bombs". Magnetometers, or metal detectors, have been staples of passenger screening for decades. Both walk-through portals and hand wands continue to be useful tools, but portals are becoming trace explosive detectors also. Some airports are installing such devices, commonly called "puffers" since they blast a puff of air as a passenger passes through in order to collect and test for explosive elements. The use of x-ray technology can be added to these portals, but many passengers currently have privacy concerns over the display of their body images, which can be "cartooned" so actual body types are not displayed.

The "Trusted Traveler" card does not carry the value that it promises, and must be paid for by the passenger, airport by airport, not as a single national card. This idea has less value as a technology solution in lieu of a properly run BPR program, as much as it is a screening placebo. Keep in mind, the vetting for this tool only occurs once a year.

Screening devices for carry-on bags have enhanced features (that have been in place for many years), but the government is preparing to further enhance these units with existing bomb detection technology. Detectors are in development for liquid explosives, but they are presently too slow and lack sufficient accuracy. Bomb sniffing dogs (K-9s) have their limitations, but are very accurate, and serve as an outstanding interim fix while we wait for future technologies currently in development. Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) is a good tool for tracking and documenting activity in the entire airport environment, from the parking lot to the airplane.

Physical security is being adjusted at many airports. This will be an essential design feature for future airport projects. Parking lot locations, terminal stand-off features and materials, as well as electronic "one way" gates to help prevent portal breaches will be among the approaches to this important element effecting passenger screening.

There are other current and emerging technologies and features that will be helpful tools for combating terrorism, combined with the human element, such as BPR, and well trained personnel to create a more intelligent and focused passenger screening system. The American public must continue to demand intelligent and effective approaches to passenger screening.

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