PCSG believes in integrated layers of security for cockpit defense. PCSG is a strong advocate of the Federal Flight Deck Officer (FFDO) program (see link at page bottom). FFDO's are the first line of deterrence and the last line of defense. They are trained to stop a threat with a heavy emphasis on defensive tactics. While the training is consistently reported as excellent, serious questions remain about the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) administration of the program. The FFDO program is a growing federal officer corps, but many more pilots are needed. Those volunteers will not be forthcoming unless fundamental changes are made to the program.
In addition to the federally run FFDO program, Title 49 CFR 1544 requires individual passenger airlines to conduct security training programs. Prior to 9/11, there was no requirement for the all-cargo airlines to provide security training for their cockpit crews. Even after the terrorist attacks on our country had made clear the potential vulnerability of an all-cargo jet to be used as a weapon of mass destruction, airline managements resisted that new paradigm in mindset. Mired in the culture of loss prevention as their only security requirements, all-cargo airlines succeeded in keeping the TSA from implementing some semblance of security training until 2008.
In addition to pilots, cabin crew members should also be trained in defensive tactics, or Crew Member Self Defense Training (CMSDT) (see link at page bottom) . Airline managements have resisted this valuable training and prefer to view cabin crews as mere food servers. Proper employment of defensive tactics could provide cockpit crews with critical time to prepare a cockpit defense plan and land the aircraft. Currently, the TSA has developed an outstanding CMSDT program that all crewmembers may take as often as they like, although this program should be a requirement. PCSG highly recommends participation in this volunteer program by all flight crew members.
The cabin crew should also have a remote means of communicating with the cockpit crew in the event of a security breach, in addition to their present primary and secondary communication methods. The Air Transport Association's (ATA) lobbying efforts defeated legislation mandating such a system, as well as other important security measures. Denying operational necessities combined with an economic bias have driven these potentially damaging decisions.
The Federal Air Marshal (FAM) program, although another excellent layer of security, has serious shortcomings, not the least of which is an agency of insufficient size.
A major problem for all three layers of security is that there is no integration of training nor a clear understanding among each group on how to work together. These three systems have been "stove piped." In addition, the TSA does not require crewmembers to receive operational Security Directives or Information Circulars. The TSA provides this information to airline corporations and lets them decide who the "need to know" employees are. Very few airlines have chosen to share this vital information with cockpit and/or cabin crews. A notable example of the failure to disseminate information to airline crews was the Richard Reid "shoe bomber" incident; previous to which, crewmembers were not told of an existing threat to passengers involving explosives. It was not until after this event that American Airlines elected to change their policy. Other airlines provide only a minimal and cryptically scrubbed version, usually in an untimely manner.
In addition to the federally run FFDO program, Title 49 CFR 1544 requires individual passenger airlines to conduct security training programs. Prior to 9/11, there was no requirement for the all-cargo airlines to provide security training for their cockpit crews. Even after the terrorist attacks on our country had made clear the potential vulnerability of an all-cargo jet to be used as a weapon of mass destruction, airline managements resisted that new paradigm in mindset. Mired in the culture of loss prevention as their only security requirements, all-cargo airlines succeeded in keeping the TSA from implementing some semblance of security training until 2008.
In addition to pilots, cabin crew members should also be trained in defensive tactics, or Crew Member Self Defense Training (CMSDT) (see link at page bottom) . Airline managements have resisted this valuable training and prefer to view cabin crews as mere food servers. Proper employment of defensive tactics could provide cockpit crews with critical time to prepare a cockpit defense plan and land the aircraft. Currently, the TSA has developed an outstanding CMSDT program that all crewmembers may take as often as they like, although this program should be a requirement. PCSG highly recommends participation in this volunteer program by all flight crew members.
The cabin crew should also have a remote means of communicating with the cockpit crew in the event of a security breach, in addition to their present primary and secondary communication methods. The Air Transport Association's (ATA) lobbying efforts defeated legislation mandating such a system, as well as other important security measures. Denying operational necessities combined with an economic bias have driven these potentially damaging decisions.
The Federal Air Marshal (FAM) program, although another excellent layer of security, has serious shortcomings, not the least of which is an agency of insufficient size.
A major problem for all three layers of security is that there is no integration of training nor a clear understanding among each group on how to work together. These three systems have been "stove piped." In addition, the TSA does not require crewmembers to receive operational Security Directives or Information Circulars. The TSA provides this information to airline corporations and lets them decide who the "need to know" employees are. Very few airlines have chosen to share this vital information with cockpit and/or cabin crews. A notable example of the failure to disseminate information to airline crews was the Richard Reid "shoe bomber" incident; previous to which, crewmembers were not told of an existing threat to passengers involving explosives. It was not until after this event that American Airlines elected to change their policy. Other airlines provide only a minimal and cryptically scrubbed version, usually in an untimely manner.
Cockpit Defense
Passenger-Cargo Security Group
Professional Aviators - Security Solutions
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