Dramatic growth and maturity for the all-cargo airline has occurred over the past 30 years. In their earlier days these airlines were not very big, and operated at night beyond the view and consciousness of the general public. Today, they are large global airlines that operate around the clock, flying the same aircraft in the same flight environment as the passenger carriers do.

For years all-cargo airlines were exempt from many of the government safety and security regulations required of passenger carriers. One such example involves a critical airborne collision avoidance system that was required of passenger aircraft but not mandated on cargo aircraft until 13 years later. This lack of uniform safety standards continues today as illustrated by their being no requirement for airport Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting (ARFF) to be provided for the all-cargo aircraft, nor for the first responders to conduct any training on all-cargo aircraft, potentially jeopardizing their lives.  This dangerous rulemaking nearly led to a significant catastrophe when a UPS Airlines DC-8 was consumed by fire in Philadelphia (2006), taking the ARFF assets 4 hours to extinguish the fire, in part due to lack of training on all-cargo aircraft.

Unfortunately, this same double standard is placing all Americans in danger since cargo airlines are not subject to similar security regulations that apply to passenger carriers. Until 2008, there has been no requirement to teach pilots of all-cargo airlines any security protocols. Given today’s security environment this is simply unacceptable. Many all-cargo airline corporations have fought against the training for their pilots claiming the cost is too great. When pilots have petitioned their companies to work with them to develop programs, airline managers have told pilots they would refuse to incorporate such training unless it is regulated by the government. It would seem obvious that an all-cargo B-767 can cause just as much damage as a passenger B-767, whether hijacked or detonated over a populated area, capable of killing thousands of innocent civilians on the ground. This is a fact that has been lost on airline corporate leaders with an economic bias, keeping them rooted in the old ways of doing business.  Hoping nothing will happen again, and believing the government bears sole responsibility for security betrays an economic bias that could endanger our nation’s citizens.

Government regulation and planned programs fall short of what is required to shore up this weakness in our aviation security as airlines and their trade associations fight against proposed measures. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) for cargo security in 2004, netting programs that only begin to address the problems.  This shortcoming leads proponents of sound security practices to seek legislation from Congress to close the loopholes.
Among its major downfalls is the TSA’s reliance on the Known Shipper (KS) program as a means of cargo screening. The KS program does not require any physical or electronic inspection. The distinction between screening and inspection is critically important. KS is simply a paper trail of the chain of custody of what is being shipped. The KS program is the same system that provided security when Charles McKinley shipped himself in a box from New York to Texas via UPS Supply Chain Solutions. What’s more frightening is that this was not an isolated event. The list of stowaways on all-cargo airlines is manifold. Fortunately none of them to date, alone or in groups, have had terrorist intent. Unfortunately, our government and airline managers are ignoring that two major European cities (and China) have been using electronic inspection equipment successfully for many years. These cities have demonstrated dramatic statistics of reduced contraband, smuggling, and terrorist related shipments. These tools would enable the United States to be proactive, versus doing little to nothing, and are not cost prohibitive either in acquisition or in throughput.  Fortunately, the legislative process has netted a law requiring the 100% inspection of all sub-load, or belly cargo, for passenger jets.  This law introduced by Rep. Ed Markey (D-MA), is a step in the right direction, but we have yet to see how the TSA and airlines will manage the implementation, and it does not address the all-cargo airline environment  

Airport security standards have seen minimal enhancement for the all-cargo operation. While minor improvements are underway for larger airports, many smaller airports are not required to have an airport security program, and are still not required to make any changes even though they host large jets and are located near major populated areas. Once again the excuse given is the fear of “financially overburdening” the all-cargo airlines. Additionally, the TSA has explained that they do not want to establish new rules that may be difficult to understand by people that never had to follow them at unregulated airports.  The current paradigm shift in security requirements demands measures that are not riveted in existing rules which may no longer be effective.

Many other loopholes in the all-cargo security environment disable otherwise effective layers of security. Sensitive Security Information (SSI) restrictions limit our discussion, but we will continue to update this web-link on an important segment of national security.

Additional Articles:

"Israel to use pilot ID system to foil suicide hijack", Dan Williams, Reuters, 1/16/2007

"TSA delays air cargo security check rule", UPI, 11/1/2006